California publishes quarterly data concerning its "enforcement" efforts against the illegal cannabis market. Over the last couple of quarters, I've gotten in the habit of analyzing this data (see here for Q3 2023, and here for Q2 2023). I've been blogging here since 2018 and my opinion is that the state is doing very, very little to stop the illegal market. And I've got data to support me.
What does California's Q4 2023 data show?
California published Q4 2023 data just a few weeks ago. In a press release, the Department of Cannabis Control (DCC) director claimed (without strong evidence, I should say) that the state was "effectively decreasing the illegal cannabis market". Here is the state's own data for Q4 2023 and 2023 as a whole:
| Operaciones de la UCETF | Q4 2023 | Año fiscal 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| Se han ejecutado órdenes de registro | 24 | 188 |
| Kilos de cannabis incautados | 13,393.65 | 189,854.02 |
| Valor de venta al público delos productosde cannabisincautados | $22,294,571.41 | $312,880,014.35 |
| Plantas de cannabis erradicadas | 20,320 | 317,834 |
| Armas de fuego incautadas | 26 | 119 |
| Dinero incautado | $35,195.25 | $223,809 |
A modo de referencia, a continuación se muestran los datos del tercer trimestre de 2023 en comparación con el segundo trimestre de 2023:
| Operaciones de la UCETF | Q3 2023 | Q2 2023 |
|---|---|---|
| Se han ejecutado órdenes de registro | 60 | 92 |
| Kilos de cannabis incautados | 61,415.75 | 66,315.01 |
| Valor de venta al público delos productosde cannabisincautados | $101,349,657 | $109,277,688.94 |
| Plantas de cannabis erradicadas | 98,054 | 120,970 |
| Armas de fuego incautadas | 69 | 19 |
| Dinero incautado | $0 | $223,809 |
First off, I don't really think we should pay much attention to the retail value columns, since it's not clear how the state is calculating retail value. Obviously, the state has an interest in calculating it in a way that increases the number and makes it look like a "win." So unless they give us the formula, I think it's safe to discard that information.
Now let's break the rest of this down. With respect to search warrants served, within the last three quarters, the state went from serving 92 search warrants, to 60 search warrants, to a depressingly low 24 search warrants. This means that Q4 saw fewer than 1/3 of the search warrants of Q2.
Likewise, the amount of pounds seized went from approximately 66,000, to approximately 61,000, to approximately 13,000 over the corresponding period. Like with the retail volume, I am a little skeptical over the "pounds seized" category because I don't know how the state calculates this - does it only mean harvested pounds? How does it treat the difference between dried and non-dried cannabis? You get the picture. But either way, the numbers just keep going down.
Observamos una tendencia similar en el caso de las plantas de cannabis incautadas. La cantidad de dinero incautado ha aumentado con respecto al tercer trimestre, pero es muy inferior a la del segundo trimestre. Y la cantidad de armas de fuego incautadas es mayor que en el segundo trimestre, pero muy inferior a la del tercer trimestre.
What to make of all this data? Well, the bottom line is that the state is doing a lot less. I think the most critical point here is the number of search warrants served, which has gone way down. Q4's 24 search warrants means that the state served about one every three days. That's in a state where the illegal market is orders of magnitude larger than the legal one. There's really no good reason why the state is doing this little.
Nuevas propuestas, pero ninguna da resultado
California always seems to have some new proposal to tackle the illicit market. Last fall the state proposed a local enforcement program that would draw on the state's attorney general for support. I predicted that the program wouldn't work. Now, months later, I don't have any data on the success of that program, but it was by definition very limited in scope. And if it had been a huge success, we'd have heard a lot more about it.
The state is now considering passing more laws to allow for enforcement. For example, SB-820 would allow the DCC or local jurisdictions to seize property used in connection with illegal cannabis activities. Like we've seen over the last few years, expect lots more of these efforts. But don't expect them to do a whole lot.
The issue here is not that the state does not have tools to adequately combat the illegal market - it does. It's that it does not use them.
Mientras tanto, el mercado ilegal sigue prosperando
While the state is busy passing laws it probably won't use effectively, the illegal market continues to grow. Occasionally, a story related to the illegal market makes its way into the mainstream news. For example, the San Bernardino Sheriff recently discovered six dead bodies in a remote area deep within the high desert - all of whom were killed by gunshot wounds. The Sheriff recently announced that the incident appears to relate to the illegal cannabis trade. I recently talked to the Associated Press about this news, and you can read that story here.
It's important to take a step back and realize that the illegal market isn't just composed of people who don't want to deal with the expense and burden of a vastly over-regulated state market. The illegal market can be a pretty grim place, as evidenced by this newest reported development.
Situación actual de la aplicación de la normativa sobre el cannabis en California
I expect that some of you might read this and think that I'm an enforcement hawk. I'm not. Here's what I said in one of my last posts on this matter:
Para que quede claro, no soy partidario de las medidas coercitivas. Creo que los incentivos funcionan mucho mejor que los desincentivos. Si el Estado quisiera eliminar el mercado ilegal del cannabis, nunca debería haber exigido costosas licencias ni haber permitido el control local. Pero, en este momento, no es muy realista pensar que el Estado vaya a hacer cosas como eliminar las licencias o los impuestos, o acabar con el control local. Incluso dejando de lado las dificultades para cambiar la ley, hay demasiada gente que ha gastado demasiado dinero en conseguir licencias. ¿Se les puede culpar por querer mantener el mercado reducido?
Si el Estado no va a hacer eso, entonces debe apostar por la aplicación de la ley,pero conuna salvedad importante. La aplicación de la ley por sí sola no funcionó durante la Ley Seca, y tampoco funcionará aquí. Si el Estado quiere reducir el mercado ilegal, deberá combinar incentivos y desincentivos. En este modelo, se eliminarían requisitos absurdos como el horario de venta de 6:00 a 22:00, que el mercado ilegal obviamente ignora. También se actuaría de forma mucho más agresiva en la incautación de productos sin licencia, aunque eso no implicara necesariamente encarcelar a la gente durante décadas (lo cual no debería hacerse).
To me, it seems clear that the best way to defeat the illegal market is to widen the tent and make legal participation easy. But if that's not going to happen, then the state has an obligation to its stakeholders who pay taxes and license fees. And for now, it's not living up to that obligation.
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